Social Work and Substantive Justice: The International Institutes’ Response to Discriminatory Immigration and Naturalization Laws, 1924–1945

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INTRODUCTION

SOCIAL WORKERS EMPLOYED BY THE International Institutes frequently encountered issues and problems arising from discriminatory federal immigration and naturalization policies. Although reformers, liberals, and missionaries had been critiquing racially discriminatory policies since the 1870s, when restrictions on Chinese immigration were first proposed and debated, by the 1920s immigration and naturalization law had evolved into a complex web of statutes and enforcement measures that required intricate navigation.¹

The discriminatory effect of these policies was especially pronounced in San Francisco, where the local International Institute’s client base included many Chinese, Japanese, and Korean immigrants who were ineligible to naturalize as citizens on racial grounds. By 1924, these groups were also categorically excluded from immigrating to the United States for the purpose of permanent settlement, although individual members were permitted admission, on a temporary basis, as merchants, students, and visitors. In a May 1934 lecture she delivered at the National Conference of Social Work meeting in Kansas City, Annie Clo Watson, Executive Secretary of the San Francisco Institute, paid lip service to the racial theory that Asian immigrants’ cultural differences might be more pronounced than those of European immigrants, making them incapable of assimilating. This was the common refrain that white restrictionists and their allies in Congress used to justify Asian immigrants’ exclusion. Watson insisted, however, that the crux of the matter was formal discrimination. Where barriers to social incorporation existed, she argued, they could be found in “legislation, first of all the exclusion acts, which set up a permanent body of non-citizens,
who cannot hold property and establish homes for their families, who are cut off from the institutions of government, who are socially, culturally, and legally isolated.”

The stringent enforcement of laws that were designed to marginalize meant that even when Asian immigrants were able to overlook the United States’ systemic discrimination against them and expressed their patriotic love of country through sentiment or action, their civic gestures went unreciprocated. In her talk in Kansas City, Watson turned to the case of “Mr. Kim” as proof of this point. Kim was a Korean immigrant who had arrived in California when he was seven, before restrictions on Japanese and Korean immigration were in place. After serving with the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I, upon his return from Europe he married an international Korean student who was attending Western College. As Watson explained, he “believed that his patriotic activity would surely somehow secure for him the privilege of keeping his wife.” By emphasizing Kim’s contributions to the war effort, Watson cast citizenship in terms of affect as well as obligation. Kim had performed his masculine duty to the nation, she implied, because he felt American. This same love of his adopted country informed his wish to create a family and secure a more permanent foothold in the United States. When Kim’s wife completed her degree, however, her student visa allowing her to remain in the United States expired. Social workers with the San Francisco Institute helped the couple submit a request to immigration officials that would allow Kim’s wife to stay on account of the marriage, but since Kim remained a noncitizen, a matter he had no choice in since he was barred from naturalizing due to his race, the appeal was denied.

In their disparate treatment of groups classified by race and nationality, immigration laws discriminated against American citizens as well. Watson explained to her colleagues that the children of Asian immigrants born in the United States, despite being birthright citizens, had fewer rights than European immigrants who had gained citizenship through naturalization. After 1924, Asian American citizens were barred from sponsoring Asian spouses and other relatives since the law forbade the immigration of individuals who were ineligible to naturalize under any circumstances. The Kims had a son who, despite being an American citizen born on California soil, could not sponsor his mother’s return as an immigrant if she was compelled to depart. In contrast, the Immigration Act of 1924 allowed for naturalized white citizens to bring over, as non-quota immigrants, their wives and children under the age of eighteen. Within the quota system, the parents of
naturalized European immigrants were also given preferences when visas were allotted annually.⁵ As Watson concluded, “the tendency of the law to strengthen and dignify family relationships for Americans of European parentage is the opposite for Americans whose background happens to be Asiatic.”⁶ Racial discrimination in naturalization law had a deleterious effect on family integrity that policymakers, in Watson’s opinion, should have instead tried to honor.

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The legal historian Felice Batlan contends that turn-of-the-century American legal aid societies were reluctant to accept that female social workers could instruct them on what justice meant to laborers, immigrants, and other marginalized populations. The lawyers providing legal aid were almost always men, and many believed that women who lacked law degrees and worked in the field could not contribute meaningful expertise and advice toward the resolution of the cases before them. The historiography exploring the development of legal aid during the Progressive era, Batlan points out, has often reproduced this bias. Scholars tend to overlook the contributions that female social workers made to the provision of legal assistance, since their involvement did not take the form of legal representation offered before courts and judges. The field of women’s history, Batlan notes, has made similar omissions. It has privileged formal legal settings as the principal sites where justice got determined.⁷

Batlan’s insights, when applied to the history of how legal assistance was extended to individuals facing immigration status issues, reveal a whole world of legal advocacy work that has gone largely unnoticed. A cursory glance at the International Institutes might result in the conclusion that legal questions and problems were not the organization’s salient concerns. The historical scholarship on immigrant social work has fixated on programs of cultural assimilation and the theories that backed these different initiatives. With the International Institutes, a reductive take would view the organization’s history as just another case study in how female social workers tried to implement a pluralist ideology to achieve assimilationist goals.

Pluralists subscribed to the belief that every immigrant group had the potential to contribute to the United States without having to abandon cultural traditions, as more conformist models for assimilation demanded. Founded by Edith Bremer in 1910 as a branch of the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), the International Institutes were adherents to this creed. The YWCA’s philosophy was that by supporting social work
conducted in immigrants’ native languages and by focusing on the challenges that immigrants faced, the Institutes’ specialization would more effectively facilitate Americanization. Following the model of Chicago’s Hull House and London’s Toynbee Hall, the individual Institutes operated as settlement houses that were physically located in the urban neighborhoods they served. They were open to immigrant publics as community centers. The Institutes hosted cultural events such as dances, theater performances, and concerts, which they used to highlight immigrants’ native cultures. The Institutes offered job placement services, conducted home visits, and offered counseling that focused on the difficulties that immigrants faced when adjusting to a new country. English-language classes taught by bilingual Institute teachers drew immigrants to the settlement houses. All of these programs were funded by grants from community chests in the different municipalities where the Institutes were located. Community chests solicited donations from local private citizens and businesses and then coordinated the distribution of these funds to various philanthropic causes deemed vital to local welfare. The San Francisco, St. Paul, and Boston Institutes, the organizations that this article focuses on, opened in 1918 and 1919, the period in which the bulk of the fifty-five Institute settlement houses were founded. The Institutes came into existence at a time when nativist demands for 100 percent Americanism and calls for the greater restriction of immigration exacerbated already prevalent suspicions about the place of foreign cultures in American society.

As a collective body, the Institutes never abandoned their mission of serving as intermediaries who introduced immigrant cultures to Americans and American culture to immigrants. By the 1920s, however, Institute social workers found themselves devoting more and more time to questions of legal status. As the San Francisco Institute reported in 1939, over the course of two decades staff members’ provision of “assistance in technical difficulties” having to do with naturalization or immigration had surpassed all other areas of work in which they were involved. Federal policies, rather than the absence of governance and regulation, dictated Institute social workers’ responsibilities. While their clients’ needs and concerns were never solely attributable to immigration and naturalization laws, Institute social workers contended that when it came to regulating entry and citizenship, in many instances the state created more social problems than it alleviated.

In response to the new demands placed on them, from the early 1930s onwards, the different Institutes gradually severed their ties to the YWCA.
Eventually the independent Institutes reorganized as the National Institute of Immigrant Welfare, which in 1944 became the American Federation of International Institutes. The San Francisco Institute’s decision to pursue a split from the YWCA in 1934 came after an extensive internal debate about why the organization was no longer a suitable partner. Although the San Francisco Institute’s staff argued that distancing themselves from the YWCA’s Protestant background was a positive step toward winning the trust of immigrants from other faiths, the need to signal the agency’s increased dedication to legal aid was an even more important factor. Female staff members at the San Francisco Institute complained about their work being devalued or misrepresented in gendered terms, since the YWCA had a reputation for doing women’s work. Separation, they argued, would help them win recognition that their social work routinely involved dealing with the wide-reaching legal and social repercussions that accompanied cases having to do with status.12

From a legal standpoint, the social workers who staffed the Institutes were uniquely positioned to evaluate why federal immigration and naturalization laws fell short of meeting a Progressive-era standard of justice. The issues and problems that Institute social workers had to deal with provide a map of where policies failed both procedurally and substantively. As Bremer claimed in a 1930 paper distributed to the different Institutes, any given case might require staff members to respond to immigrants’ “trouble through illness, want of money, confusion in testimony, uncertainty of classification, disruption of family, [or] inadequacy of papers.”13 Poverty and sickness were not issues intrinsic to the governance of legal status—although they were not unrelated either—but the remaining problems that Bremer enumerated could be traced back to the enforcement of what she insisted were poorly designed and discriminatory policies.

Although it is not the focus of this article, it is important to note that the Institutes were avid lobbyists and involved in a wide range of federal and state-level policy debates concerning legislation that would affect immigration or naturalization. Describing in 1930 the role that the Institutes could play in advocating for revisions to the Immigration Act of 1924, Bremer urged her colleagues to “help tinker it into a more humane shape.”14 As this article does address, this right to tinker was predicated on the fact that the Institutes aided a diverse medley of clients, from Armenian immigrants in Boston denied the right to reunite with relatives who had fled genocide to Mexicans in St. Paul who were being coerced into repatriating and specially targeted for deportation.
Despite their lack of formal legal training, Institute social workers registered the injustice, inefficiencies, and unfairness of immigration and naturalization laws in ways that illuminate why it is important for historians to take seriously emotional and experiential frames of reference. This is especially true when it comes to immigration and naturalization laws, which carried a different standard of what constituted due process in respect to immigrants’ right to appeal or contest the enforcement of the discriminatory policies that Congress had legislated. By the early twentieth century, the Bureau of Immigration’s nearly unchecked power to rule in immigration and naturalization cases led opponents, as the legal historian Lucy Salyer has documented, to criticize the agency as tyrannical. When Institute staff members spoke of the ways in which immigration and naturalization laws failed to uphold a standard of substantive justice, they did so by citing specific cases from the frontlines of their social work. The Institutes’ efforts to humanize their clients’ needs should not be set aside as moral suasion or dismissed as sentimental discourse lacking in empiricism and comprehension of the law. Through the employment of immigrant and second-generation caseworkers who spoke the language of their clients and came from these communities, the Institutes were well positioned to comment on the laws’ day-to-day impact and failure to serve the public good.

It would be a mistake, however, to treat the Institutes as the unimpeachable champions of immigrants or to assign them a philosophy in which their vision of justice went beyond achieving procedural and substantive fairness under the rule of law. The Institutes did not openly resist discriminatory immigration and naturalization laws. Unlike immigrants who contested legal injustices through their refusal to adhere to the law, the Institutes preached compliance and reform through legislation. In one notable instance, the San Francisco International Institute’s position as an intermediary between the federal government and ethnic communities led it to become involved in the parole of 138 Filipino “boys” (as the laboring men of various ages were referred to in the Institute’s records). These migrants had departed for the United States before the Tydings-McDuffie Act was ratified by Congress and the Philippine Legislature in 1934, but arrived in San Francisco after its enactment. Officials at Angel Island had detained the Filipino men, whose legal status had changed while they were in the middle of the Pacific, on the grounds that they lacked visas. While their appeal was pending, a decision was made to release and parole them to the care of the Institute. Eight months later, in February 1935, when immigration officials in Washington reached their decision and only two of the 138 men were granted the right to remain
in the United States, the Institute assumed responsibility for informing the now deportable men of their legal responsibility to report for voluntary repatriation. Given the fact that the men left Manila as colonial subjects of the United States who were exempt from immigration restrictions, their rejection on the grounds that they had become unauthorized was exactly the type of ex post facto change that denied substantive justice to individuals who thought that they had followed the law. In this case, however, the Institute readily assisted efforts to locate the men for removal.

The final section of this article looks at how new arrangements for governing migrants created new opportunities for delivering justice and, in the process, redefined what justice might mean. With the Institutes, this involved providing aid to Mexican guest workers admitted as braceros during World War II. The terms of the bracero program meant that the Institutes could advocate on behalf of Mexican immigrants, not as candidates for naturalization or as citizens entitled to the full protection of the law, as they had done during the 1930s in response to campaigns that were designed to coerce Mexicans into leaving the country, but as bilateral treaty subjects. Freed from having to contend with immigration and naturalization laws governing settlement and formal assimilation, the Institutes accepted a reality in which certain migrants were to be treated as noncitizen temporary subjects. As policies shifted to accommodate economically pragmatic forms of inclusion, so too did the immigrant legal services that the Institutes provided.

JUSTICE BEYOND THE COURTROOM: STORIES FROM THE FIELD

In 1923, the social worker and reformer Kate Holladay Claghorn published *The Immigrant’s Day in Court*. The carefully researched text, funded and published by the Carnegie Foundation, took a holistic approach to exploring the myriad ways immigrants interacted with the American legal system and its many representatives and institutions. Claghorn included a lengthy appraisal of the role that the Bureau of Immigration played in deciding and enforcing status cases. Immigrant communities and Americans concerned with civil liberties, she argued, were justified in harboring grievances against the immigration system, since its rulings on whether or not immigrants were eligible to enter the United States and remain in the country in a manner that conformed to norms of what represented “substantial justice.” Claghorn noted that punishing immigrants for the possession of certain political beliefs and targeting racial groups rather
than individuals contravened fundamental American principles. Moreover, vaguely defined standards for determining whether or not an immigrant was “likely to become a public charge” meant that the law by definition could not be applied consistently and without bias across a range of cases. The Bureau was to the immigrant, Claghorn pointed out, police, judge, and jailer, whereas in other areas of the law these powers were conscientiously separated.¹⁹

Claghorn believed that reforms could make bureau officials conform to the principles of delivering “substantial” (substantive) justice. Her focus on the need for courts to establish just policies and enforcement measures reflected a pre-1924 viewpoint of the issue, where the debarment of an individual immigrant was still a matter to be determined by boards of special inquiry at immigration stations in ports of entry. After 1924, immigrants could only depart for the United States if they had visas issued by the State Department, which greatly reduced the number of cases where eligibility for admission had to be actively adjudicated by immigration inspectors.²⁰ Although the San Francisco Institute, for example, worked with occasional clients detained at Angel Island who were awaiting decisions on whether they would be permitted entry, in general the agency’s social workers’ legal aid was removed from the realm of admission hearings.

The Institutes’ cases varied significantly, since immigrants, depending on their race, gender, and nationality, had different legal statuses and rights under the law. The Institutes did not employ staff attorneys, and there is no evidence that they relied on lawyers’ advice to help them navigate the bureaucratic and legal complexities that their cases posed. Sarah Ellis, the International Institute’s liaison at the Angel Island immigration station, described a representative workday in a 1927 article in The Woman’s Press. A portion of her day was spent procuring albums from the Institute’s collection of Chinese music for a teenaged girl awaiting a decision on her right to enter, who had “spent hours weeping for fear of being returned to China.” Ellis hoped the music would be a small distraction to the detained woman. She conducted makeshift English lessons with the son of a Chinese merchant similarly held in limbo. Ellis was also a one-woman “information service” who instructed individuals on how to obtain paperwork and government assistance related to the procurement of visas. As part of her day’s work, Ellis advised a Greek immigrant woman, for instance, on how to obtain a replacement quota visa since the original had failed to arrive in the remote village where her sister lived. She handled a series of inquiries about how to extend student visas and obtain citizenship papers. “Seeing all of this,”
Ellis wrote, “one longs for some shorter path in detecting who are worthy, or who are unworthy, of admission into the United States.”

Institute social workers offered firsthand evidence, disregarded by policymakers, about how discriminatory policies impeded their ability to convince immigrants that the United States viewed them as valuable assets. In Boston, for instance, the Institute’s Armenian nationality worker, Olympia Yeranian, noted in her 1925 report that local Armenian immigrants viewed the recently passed Immigration Act as callously indifferent to the plight of their family members and friends who had suffered through the atrocities of the Ottoman genocide. Armenian immigrants felt “bitterness” toward the United States government and its refusal to extend asylum, which in turn interfered with the Institute’s efforts to promote patriotism among those who entered prior to the passage of nationality quotas.

The federal government’s indifference toward Armenian refugees, Yeranian pointed out, undermined the Institute’s efforts in other areas as well. Armenian women in the Boston area were manufacturing curtains as take-home work in tenements, even though the Institute had tried to condemn these jobs as unsanitary and antithetical to the middle-class domesticity it espoused. Armenian women pursued these informal working arrangements, Yeranian noted, in order to have money to send to relatives living as refugees. Often a husband’s wages were reserved for supporting his family members in similar situations. The legal complications that accompanied migration were vast, and of course some problems that Yeranian contended with were not caused by the quota system. In 1930, Yeranian reported researching whether wills created abroad would have legal standing in Massachusetts. She was also trying to decipher whether “bonds issued by the ‘Imperial Ottoman Government,’ which no longer existed, might be redeemed in the United States.” The need to provide social services of this nature persisted even as legal status concerns ate up more of social workers’ time.

The mass expansion of relief programs during the Great Depression and New Deal foregrounded the importance of citizenship and drastically altered what it meant to perform social work around the issues of immigrants’ right to naturalize and the benefits of doing so. Although the federal Social Security program did not include explicit citizenship requirements, its Old Age Assistance program was administered by states, which were allowed to create their own eligibility standards. In addition, while the original Works Progress Administration relief program did not require job applicants to be citizens, this was changed in 1936. More generally, local civil service jobs, which were an important source of relief to unemployed workers, were
often off-limits to noncitizen applicants. All of this meant that the Institutes also had to spend more resources and staff on naturalization cases.

The Institutes were frustrated that the new importance assigned to citizenship had the result of cheapening assimilation as a concept, since civic membership had become defined mainly in terms of allowing an immigrant to stave off deportation and to gain access to benefits. The scramble for rights and benefits infringed upon the idea that citizenship in a liberal democracy represented a meaningful social contract rooted in real sentiment, which bonded citizens to the state. “It is not her fault,” Bremer argued in 1930, referencing a hypothetical immigrant woman who naturalized as soon as she was eligible to, despite not yet identifying with the United States as her imagined community, since “the ruthless combination of immigration, deportation, and naturalization laws, have turned the possession of citizenship into a new type of social insurance.” She added that the “marked desire of the U.S. Bureaus of Immigration, to have the naturalization system serve as a sort of secret constable to the enforcement of the immigration law, has knocked the last breath of idealism out of the whole matter.”

When it came to Asian immigrants and American-born citizens of Asian descent, racial bias within naturalization laws combined with the gender inequality already embedded in the concept of dependent citizenship. A section of the San Francisco Institute’s 1936 report was devoted to a case titled “Resumption of Citizenship,” which highlighted the Institute’s dogged assistance of an American-born Chinese woman identified by the pseudonym “Mrs. Hoy.” In 1906, while just a teenager, Hoy was sent to China by her parents, where she entered into an arranged marriage with a “village boy.” Despite raising several children there, Hoy did not feel at home and maintained “one dream,” the report explained with dramatic flourish, “to return to San Francisco to live.” Ten years after her husband’s death, in 1934, Hoy departed China with the intent of reuniting with her family still in the United States.

The federal government’s interpretation of how race and gender defined eligibility for citizenship conspired against Hoy’s plans. Upon arriving in San Francisco, she discovered that she no longer had the right to enter her country of birth as a native-born citizen. With the passage of the Expatriation Act in 1907, Congress revoked the citizenship of American women who married noncitizens, regardless of whether the couple resided in the United States or abroad. A woman could only regain her citizenship if her husband naturalized, making her legal status dependent on his. Although the protests of women’s rights advocates led Congress to pass the 1922 Cable Act, which
allowed American women to retain their citizenship independently of their husbands’ status, this only applied to women who married a noncitizen husband eligible to naturalize. By virtue of the 1870 Naturalization Act and the Chinese exclusion and general immigration acts, men classified as Asian were not allowed to become American citizens. In the 1925 case of *Ex parte Fung Sing*, the federal district court in Seattle ruled that the American-born widow Ng Fung Sing was prohibited from entering the United States on the grounds that her marriage to a non-citizen Chinese man meant that she was to be treated as an immigrant born in her husband’s country of origin. Her admissibility was therefore governed by the rules of the relevant immigration statutes. Since the 1924 Immigration and Nationality Act barred outright the immigration of persons ineligible to citizenship, except as non-quota, temporary visitors, this meant that American women who had left the country and assumed the nationality of their Asian husbands were barred from reentering the United States as legal immigrants, even if they were widowed or divorced. Congress amended the naturalization statutes in 1931 so that they no longer automatically revoked the citizenship of American women who married Asian men ineligible to naturalize, but the change did not apply retroactively to women who had already lost this status.\(^{28}\)

This muddled concoction of policies—organized around the patriarchal principle that women forfeited their birthright citizenship upon marriage to an alien and the racial belief that Asians could not be incorporated into the American body politic—meant that Hoy could have been turned away and prevented from even landing. Instead, she was able to procure from immigration officials a one-year temporary visa. Since the Institute had representatives stationed on Angel Island, it is likely that her case came to its attention immediately, and it may have even intervened to help her gain entrance. Under the tutelage of the Institute, she began studying for the citizenship test. Technically, Hoy should have been banned from taking the naturalization test altogether, and government officials would have been within their powers to deny her this opportunity on racial grounds. When Hoy failed the naturalization test, the Institute, through means undescribed, was also able to help her receive two extensions on her guest visa.

A break came for Hoy in 1936, when President Roosevelt signed into law Congressional legislation that allowed denaturalized American-born women to “resume” their citizenship by swearing only an oath of allegiance. This legislation was intended to placate American-born white women who felt that taking the citizenship test was an indignity and unjust obstacle.\(^{29}\) Hoy was able to take advantage as well. A final bureaucratic challenge entailed
tracking down a death certificate for Hoy’s husband, from the village where they had lived in China. Mobilizing its contacts among American consular officials working abroad, the Institute guided Hoy through this process as well. There are no records documenting the back-and-forth exchanges that must have taken place between federal officials and Institute social workers. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to infer that Naturalization officials decided to grant Hoy special permission to naturalize. Federal officials were often dependent on the Institutes for practical assistance having to do with pending cases, and it would not be surprising if the bureau occasionally extended social workers and their clients certain extralegal privileges.

“Resumption of Citizenship” concludes with Hoy at a naturalization ceremony. Called to the front of the room, the report described how “proudly and alone [Hoy] went forward” and “raised her right hand and took the oath of allegiance to her native land.” The resolution of Hoy’s problems and concerns was not necessarily as pat as this narrative made it out to be. Children born outside of the United States before 1934 inherited their citizenship status from their father. As a result, Hoy’s restored citizenship did not grant her children the right to immigrate and join her.

All of the Institutes relied on employees—nationality workers—who had language skills and roots in the immigrant and ethnic communities they served. As a result, Institute social workers were equipped to understand their clients’ circumstances and needs in a more comprehensive manner than legal aid providers who spoke only English and were strangers to immigrants’ backgrounds. At the most basic level, Institute social workers could interpret and translate what their immigrant clients needed in order to navigate complex bureaucracies that posed procedural obstacles to obtaining due process before the law. The Institutes were important employers to immigrants and the American-born second generation. The San Francisco Institute’s Chinese nationality worker, for instance, was Rose Chew, the San Francisco–born daughter of Ng Poon Chew, the publisher of Chung Sai Yat Pao, the city’s first Chinese language newspaper. Chew, in addition to conducting individual casework, authored a 1930 investigative report documenting how racial bias and discrimination affected the American-born children of Chinese immigrants who expected to possess the equal rights that their citizenship ostensibly promised. The roles that the Institutes’ staff played are important reminders that the enforcement of federal policies compelled the creation of translator positions, where both social work and enforcement work around legal status questions required individuals who were capable of bridging linguistic and cultural worlds.
IMMIGRANTS AND BRACEROS: FEDERAL POLICIES AND THE TERMS OF SOCIAL WORK

The differing forms of assistance that International Institutes provided to Mexican immigrants and braceros, in the 1930s and 1940s respectively, demonstrates how central federal policies were to dictating the form that social work would take. In Minnesota, the St. Paul International Institute observed in a 1936 investigative report that most of the city’s roughly fifteen hundred Mexican residents had first been recruited to the state in the 1920s by employment agents of the Sugar Beet Growers Association. The fact that Mexicans had lived in St. Paul for more than a decade helped them gain the Institute’s assistance, since typically immigrant communities had to reach a certain size and permanence before Institutes could hire nationality workers from them.

Prior to the Great Depression, immigration officials regularly displayed a willingness to overlook the 1885 Contract Labor Law, which prohibited American employers from recruiting and contracting laborers from Mexico. Prohibitions on the recruitment of Mexican contract laborers were formally suspended during World War I, after growers in the southwest United States appealed to the federal government about labor shortages, and were not reinstated until 1921. Until 1924, there were no patrols along the Mexico–United States border, which meant that many migrant laborers were able to come and go without obstruction or regulation. In Minnesota it had become common, the report observed, for Mexicans to move to cities like St. Paul during the winter, when beets were not being grown and harvested. During more flush times, the Sugar Beet Growers Association extended wintertime credit to unemployed workers living in the Twin Cities and set some up with jobs in affiliated factories where the sugar was processed. In Minnesota, mass unemployment brought on by the Depression meant that by the 1930s, a significant number of white locals had grown intolerant toward resident Mexicans—despite the fact that many had lived in the state for years. By 1936, the Institute noted, “Minnesota Mexican families wander about from place to place looking for work in competition with white workers and other Mexican workers driven up from the South by unemployment.” Some growers were posting signs that declared: “only white labor employed.”

The Great Depression prompted officials to remove Mexican workers and their families as surplus labor who might claim to be entitled to relief. With unemployment rampant, beet growers no longer had any incentive to
look to the migrant Mexican labor supply and abandoned these workers to their own devices. The term repatriation, which has been used to describe the mass removal of Mexicans, is a misnomer that fails to capture the more coercive environment that prevailed. Federal, state, and local officials pursued informal repatriation so that they could avoid the more rigorous due process standards that attended to legal deportation. At the same time, the Commissioner General of Immigration, Harry E. Hull, formally directed officers in February 1931 to more actively enforce section 23 of the 1917 Immigration Act, which authorized the deportation of any immigrant who had within three years of their arrival received public relief. Mexicans, whom white officials and the public racialized as foreigners and impermanent subjects—unlike white immigrants—were disproportionally targeted under these new guidelines. As the legal historian Daniel Kanstroom points out, officials cited “lack of proof of legal residency” as grounds for removal, even though Mexican immigrants were not required at this point to enter with visas or other formal documentation. An estimated sixty percent of the one million persons returned to Mexico in the 1930s were American citizens by birth, since mixed families composed of immigrants and their American-born children or spouses were removed or chose to leave together.33

In contrast to Asian immigrants, the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and its subsequent interpretation in federal court extended citizenship and the right to naturalize to Mexicans, as an annexed population and immigrants respectively. As the sociologists Irene Bloemraad and Cybelle Fox have shown, in 1930 only 9 percent of eligible Mexican immigrant men living in the United States had naturalized, whereas 60 to 80 percent of eligible European immigrants had become citizens. Bloemraad and Fox point out that while the mobility of agricultural laborers and illiteracy may have been factors in the low rate of Mexican naturalization, the de facto discrimination they faced—and the willingness of officials to overlook their citizenship when this status was obtained—also played significant roles.34

Even though Bremer and other Institute employees may have lamented how citizenship had lost its sincerity as an expression of love for country, they were pragmatists when it came to finding ways to ensure that some semblance of justice would be served to families who might otherwise be deported for petty reasons. While American citizenship was not a guarantee that Mexican immigrants would be protected from coerced repatriation and deportation, it still provided some degree of security. In 1930 Bremer instructed Institute social workers to pursue naturalization drives since this meant that immigrants—and Mexicans in particular—would not be deported
for minor criminal offenses or on account of potentially biased judgments that determined they were public charges.35

The St. Paul Institute reported in 1936 that it had been advising members of the Mexican community living on the city’s Lower West Side about the significance of repatriation as opposed to deportation, which was unclear to many residents. The terms of an individual’s exit and whether they were deported or voluntarily repatriated determined their eligibility to reenter the United States in the future. “The relief agencies have carefully scrutinized the residence of every St. Paul Mexican family who is on relief,” the Institute’s report commented. By 1936, the report continued, the city had succeeded in culling Mexicans from the rolls as much as it could, either by pressuring repatriation or obtaining deportation orders from the federal government. It had moved on to forcing seasonal residents to return to the Minnesota towns and counties where they had last been employed, so that they would have to apply to those governments for relief instead. Citizenship, the Institute expressed in dire terms, remained crucial, and its workers were actively involved in a campaign to get eligible Mexican immigrants to naturalize. As had always been the case, their increased focus on legal matters did not stop Institute workers from also engaging in educational programming, which in St. Paul meant an emphasis on English-language lessons to the American-born children of Mexican migrants representing roughly one-half of the community. The St. Paul Institute also still endeavored to combat what it called Mexican “itineracy” and lobbied for initiatives that would better assimilate and root the community. The significance of these efforts notwithstanding, the report concluded that racial discrimination in hiring was the most important factor explaining the problems that St. Paul’s Mexican community faced. “Given a job which permits them to live in a permanent home, even at the very low income that has been the common lot of all immigrant labor,” the report argued, “the Mexican family has shown that it can adjust itself to life in North American cities.”36

The creation of the bracero program in 1942 and the governance of Mexican migrant laborers as guestworkers changed how the Institutes approached Mexican migrants’ rights. Whereas during the 1930s the issue was naturalization and the de facto discrimination that Mexican American citizens faced as targets for repatriation and deportation, assisting guestworkers required a different approach. Integration under the bracero program had nothing to do with permanent assimilation and was instead a managerial project that required Institute workers to collaborate with Mexican consular officials stationed in the United States. Their mission was to advocate on
behalf of braceros when the Mexican workers accused private employers of violating the terms of the two countries’ bilateral agreement. Whereas in the 1930s Institute social workers had to contend with questions about how transience, racial discrimination, naturalization, and mixed families composed of noncitizens and citizens affected this community, the bracero program allowed them to advocate on behalf of Mexican workers as a matter of guaranteeing their treaty rights. When the Institutes advocated on behalf of guestworkers caught up in labor disputes, it was both to assist them in negotiations with employers but also to keep them working.

With the bracero agreement, the Institutes had no choice but to accept temporary residence as a feature of federal policy. In exchange for accepting this reality, social workers gained access to state officials, albeit those representing Mexico, and the ability to advocate for migrant workers who had rights that, on paper at least, appeared to have been determined in a just manner. The bracero program was enacted in August 1942 first as an executive agreement and later through congressional legislation, after the United States entered World War II and labor shortages in the sugar beet and other industries returned with mass conscription. The bracero program was a bilateral agreement, and the Mexican government—with varying degrees of involvement depending on the locality—coordinated and oversaw the recruitment of workers for the program. Labor relations between Mexican guestworkers and employers in the United States came under the jurisdiction of both local American officials and Mexican diplomatic officials, although only the latter proved to be consistently interested in trying to remediate abuses. The bracero program moved the Institute beyond the framework of assimilation altogether and toward an understanding of integration that was structured by the principles of creating fairly administered forms of temporary incorporation rather than permanent absorption.37

Bilateralism allowed the Institutes to extend a form of legal aid that was backed by diplomatic allies with treaty powers. Moreover, records seem to suggest that Mexican officials in the United States relied on the expertise and intimate connections to far flung and dispersed communities of workers that the Institutes had cultivated through their casework. In March 1943, for instance, the San Francisco Institute was appointed by the Mexican consul to formally represent Mexican laborers in Pinole, Crockett, and Vallejo who had threatened to leave their employ with the Southern Pacific Railroad Company. Institute representatives, while seeking a resolution that would allow the braceros to continue working, spoke on behalf of the laborers and not as neutral arbiters. The Institute reported back to Mexican officials that
the workers had been forced to subsist on “rancid” beans and insufficient portions of food. Mandatory fees were taken from their paychecks for a doctor who, when accidents or illness occurred, was never actually available. In January 1944, the Institute handled Mexican laborers’ complaints that, in violation of their contract, the Santa Fe Railroad Company, which employed and housed seventy-nine contract laborers as mechanics across the bay in Richmond, was automatically withdrawing the cost of company-provided meals—which were poorly prepared—even when workers ate elsewhere. The railroad had also failed to itemize the deducted price of goods purchased from the commissary on workers’ paychecks, which the laborers alleged had led to wage theft. In both labor-management disputes, Mexican consular officials turned to the Institute to mediate the dispute in a just manner and to ensure that the braceros received fair representation from social workers who could be trusted to appreciate and understand the laborers’ complaints. In these and other cases, the goal of the Institutes was to set in motion arbitration where workers and employers could settle conflicts and agree to return to full employment and production.

Sometimes it was the Institutes who informed Mexican consulate officials about abuses of braceros rather than the other way around. This was the case in Minnesota, where the Institute was approached by a group of braceros from Guanajuato in June 1945. The Mexican laborers had been contracted to work on beet farms in Danube and Olivia, small agricultural communities approximately 110 miles west of St. Paul. (Jokingly, the workers told the Institute staff that they had decided “to take the last car as that was likely to go the farthest where they would be paid the most.”) The laborers’ private “ overseer,” as he was described in an Institute memorandum, had paid them $3.33 total for their initial 102 hours of work, as opposed to the minimum of $30 that they should have earned. When workers protested that the thirty cents an hour they were supposed to earn in wages had been put toward room and board, in clear violation of their contracts, they were removed by force to a rural crossroads and instructed to “foot it” back to Mexico. Instead they walked to St. Paul, where a member of the city’s Mexican community put them in touch with the Institute. The Institute first brought the complaint to the federal office of the War Food Administrator, who was responsible for bracero contracts in Minnesota. When he accused the Mexican workers of being lazy and along for a free adventure and threatened to have them deported, the Institute instead went to Antonio Islas, the Mexican consul in Chicago, thus making the incident an official diplomatic matter. An arrangement was made for the workers to
be contracted out to different beet farms, which allowed them to remain in
the United States. The Institute in this case could only go so far in helping
the workers. Unable to pursue the men’s back wages effectively, Islas and
the Institute could only reassure the men—optimistically—that they would
be able to make up the lost earnings in the future. The braceros returned
to work.

CONCLUSION

Although it is only an epilogue to the histories presented here, it is not
surprising that during World War II, social workers from the Institutes were
enlisted to serve as intermediaries between the federal government and the
Japanese Americans it had incarcerated. At the February 17, 1942 meeting
of the San Francisco Institute’s Board, Watson explained that “the Institute
always tried to be what it thinks America is and should be—a partnership
between old and more recent Americans.” This statement of principle was
intended to reassure the Institute’s staff and board members that the organi-
zation would hold fast in arguing that Japanese immigrants and their chil-
dren were indeed part of America. Watson also emphasized “that we work
within the law” (underlined by the stenographer), which was an indication
that the Institute would not meet attempts to round up Japanese Americans
with more active forms of resistance. Two days later, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 commenced the process of removing
and detaining 120,000 Japanese Americans on the grounds that they were
a threat to national security.

As the sociologist Yoosun Park argues, white social workers, while mainly
opposed to internment as an unconstitutional violation of civil liberties,
played an essential support role in enabling detention to be carried out. Social workers scrambled, as they did in response to immigration and natu-
ralization policies, to accommodate those affected by a federal initiative that
they opposed. During the war, the San Francisco Institute worked closely
with internees who had frequented the settlement house before their incar-
ceration and aided them in finding jobs and sponsors outside the camps
when they became eligible for paroled release. On January 26, 1943, the
San Francisco Institute reported that it had sent a piano from its settlement
house and headquarters on Washington Street, which had originally been
donated by members of the city’s Japanese community, to the internment
camp in Topaz, Utah, where it could be used by detainees. Although the
piano had once symbolized the Japanese community’s gratitude for the
Institute’s work, it now epitomized social workers’ limited capacity to thwart the deprivations and humiliations that came with internment.41

* * *

As this article has argued, whether or not immigrants and American citizens receive fair treatment can only be evaluated when we take a holistic approach to answering this question. When social workers must devote countless hours responding to the needs of children who are American citizens, for instance, because they have been separated from unauthorized immigrant parents deported for minor criminal violations, it is not a radical proposition to assert that there is something wrong with the way things are functioning.42 The enforcement of immigration laws remains, as numerous scholars have documented, a racialized form of social control and an exercise of sovereign power that is prejudiced and biased in its application.43 Today, the social work performed on behalf of deported immigrants has a more pronounced transnational cast to it, with agencies required to determine how to assist, if at all possible, individuals who get returned to nations in which they have no roots and no support networks.44 In 2017 it is difficult to ignore the Trump administration’s promises to continue to ramp up deportation efforts and the corresponding concern that sanctuary cities, which have chosen to recognize and protect undocumented immigrants as participants in their communities’ economic and social life, will be punished for doing so.45 Justice will of course always be a subjective concept. Acknowledgment of this fact does not mean that the public must surrender the ability to judge whether immigration policies achieve a version of public good. Policymakers and the public would be wise to look to the social work that immigration laws necessitate in the present, as a guide to determining what types of controls and enforcement measures are unnecessarily punitive, ineffective, and cruel.

NOTES

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1. White Protestant missionaries were concerned that restrictive policies would undermine the inclusive version of Christianity that they were trying to impart. Missions were also important social services providers. On turn-of-the-century racial liberalism and its


3. On the racism that marked the discretionary enforcement of immigration laws, especially toward Asian immigrants, see Erika Lee and Judy Yung, *Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29–68, and Adam McKeown, “Ritualization of Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion in the United States and China,” *American Historical Review* 108, no. 2 (April 2003): 377–403. The 1924 Immigration Act included a new definitional category of migrants who were classified as temporary visitors rather than as immigrants. This included, for instance, Chinese merchants who were previously granted admission as immigrants and allowed to remain in the country on a permanent basis so long as their occupational status did not change. Under the 1924 Act, merchant visas were granted for a set period of time unless renewed. “Definition of ‘Immigrant,’” *1924 Immigration Act (An act to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States, and for other purposes)*, 43 Stat. 669, Section 3.


5. On the 1924 Immigration Act’s discrimination against Asian immigrants relative to its treatment of Europeans, see Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 21–55. In 1925, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle* that the wives of Chinese merchants, in accordance with the intentions of the 1924 Immigration Act, were permitted to enter the United States with their husbands or to join them if they were already in residence. That same year, the Supreme Court ruled in *Chang Chan v. Nagle* that the Chinese-born wives of American-born Chinese citizens were denied the right of entry. As the legal scholar Shira Morag Levine argues, the Supreme Court may have been motivated by allegations and concerns that American-born Chinese were not fit for birthright citizenship. See Levine, “A ‘Vital Question of Self-Preservation’: Chinese Wives, Merchants, and American Citizens Caught in the 1924 Immigration Act,” *Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties* 9 (January 2013): 121–51.

6. Watson, “Special Nationality Problems of the Pacific Coast,” ACWP, Box 1, Folder 3.


10. To this day, for instance, the International Institute of Minnesota continues to sponsor an annual “Festival of Nations.” As was the case in the past, cultural programming such as this coexists alongside legal advocacy work on behalf of refugees and immigrants. International Institute of Minnesota website, http://iimn.org.

11. San Francisco International Institute, “Annual Report for the Year 1939,” The International Institute of San Francisco Records, General/Multiethnic Collection, Immigration History Research Center Archives, University of Minnesota [hereafter cited as IISFR], Box 1, Folder 18.


14. Ibid.
18. Watson to Edward Haff, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, May 4, 1934; Watson to Haff, April 11, 1935; Mrs. James Reed, President, Board of Directors, to Haff, September 18, 1936, IISFR, Box 21, Folder 16.
22. Leading up to the 1924 Act, the Senate entertained measures that would have allowed unused Turkish quotas—which had been introduced provisionally in 1921—to go to ethnic Armenian refugees. But these never made it into the final bill. The 1924 Act fixed the Armenian quota at 124 immigrants per year, and the quota for Turkey, where many refugees remained, at only one hundred. Yael Schacher, “Refugees and Restrictionism: Armenian Women Immigrants to the USA in the Post–World War I Era,” in *Gender, Migration and Categorisation: Making Distinctions between Migrants in Western Countries, 1945–2010*, eds. Marlou Schrover and Deirdre M. Moloney (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 55–74. Olympia Yeranian, “Monthly Report of the Armenian Secretary of the International Institutes, August 1924,” The International Institute of Boston [hereafter IIB], Massachusetts Records, General/Multiethnic Collection, IHRC Archives, University of Minnesota, Box 1, Folder 2.
24. Yeranian, “Report of Armenian Secretary, April, May, June, 1930,” IIB, Box 1, Folder 8.


27. San Francisco International Institute, “Confidential Supplement to the Annual Report of the International Institute, 1936,” IISFR, Box 1, Folder 15. Subsequent references to Hoy's case come from this report.


32. Alice Sickels, the Institute’s director, presented this report at the Minnesota State Social Work Conference. Its findings were based on surveys that the Institute had distributed. St. Paul International Institute, “The Mexican Nationality Community in St. Paul in 1936,” The International Institute of Minnesota Records [hereafter IIMR], General/Multietnic Collection, Immigration History Research Center Archives, University of Minnesota, Box...


Bremer, “A Forward Look for International Institutes,” IISFR, Box 1, Folder 9.


The bracero program was enacted as a bilateral executive agreement between the United States and Mexico. Unlike other federal immigration policies, it authorized private employers to recruit and sponsor foreign workers as temporary rather than permanent migrants. On the pro-business ideologies undergirding the bracero program’s creation and implementation, see Kitty Calavita, *Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S.* (New York: Routledge, 1992) and Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 127–66.

San Francisco International Institute, “Mexican Laborers at Richmond, California, 1944,” IISFR, Box 21, Folder 13.

St. Paul International Institute, “Memorandum of Special Services Given by the International Institute to a Group of Mexican Nationals . . .1945,” IIMR, Box 13, Folder 201.


San Francisco International Institute, “Board Meeting Minutes, January 26, 1943,” IISFR, Box 2, Folder 4.

As researchers with the Migration Policy Institute and Urban Institute documented in a 2015 report, between one-fourth and one-fifth of the 3.7 million immigrants deported between 2003 and 2013 had children who were American citizens. The report shows how

